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IN THE SUPR.Hrn COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON LAYTOH, aka Donald w. ) 
Layton, and HELEN D. LAYTON,) 
his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs and ) 
Appellants, ) 
) Case No. ll298 
-vs- ) 
) 
GORDON E. HOLT and S. JOHN ) 
WEBBER; SALT LAKE COUNTY, ) 
a body politic of the State ) 
of Utah; MARVIN JENSOI~, ) 
Commissioner, ) 
) 
Defendants and ) 
Respondents. ) 
) 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the appellant, Don Layton, and 
respectfully petitions the Court to grant a rehear-
ing and to reconsider the above cause, upon the 
following grounds: 
1 
OUTLINE OF PETITION 
A. 1. The Court erred in presuming a tax title 
had been created. 
2. The Court erred concerning the meaning of 
the word possession as used in the statute. 
3. The Court erred in concluding that respon-
dents had perfected rights to invoke the aid of the 
statute of limitations. 
B. 1. The opinion is contradictory to: 
~ a. u .s. Constitution 14th Amendment. A'!. ~-r, ,('Is 
b. Utah State Constitution, Art. 6, 3 & 'Zl 
c. Utah State Statutes 78-12-7 .1 
i 
2 
/] 1. The Court erred in assuming that resp-
ondents had purchased a "tax title" for the reason 
that at the commencement of this action, no tax 
title as defined in the statute existed. 
78-12-5.3 Definition of "tax title" ••• 
'.Ihe term "tax ti tle 11 • • • means any title· 
to real property, whether valid or not •• 
whereby the property is relieved from a 
tax lien. 
The record clearly shOl'fs (Certificate in appel-
1ant 1s abstract) that the County's equity in the 
property by virtue of non payment of taxes had never 
been cleared. This lien would itseli' have been 
barred long ago as would a judgment, or has it been 
maintained as a debt to the State under Constitu-
tional provision,Article · 6 Sec. 'Z7 Utah State 
Constitution. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 
Vol II p. 770 states: 
"It is certain th at he who has satisfied a 
demand by the operation of the statute of 
limitations is equally protected. In both 
cases the demand is gone, and to restore 
it would be to create a new contract for the 
parties, - a thing quite beyond the power 
of legislation. 8 
3 
It follows logically that if taxes are debts 
against the state, then they are never relieved 
iuntil the state gets the money for them by selling 
or assigning its lien. 1his provision certainly 






Section 59-10-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 states: . 
"Tax has effect of judgment - lien has effect 
of execution - Every tax has the effect of 
a judgment against the person and every lien 
created by this title has the force and effect 
of an execution duly levied against all person-
al property of the delinquent. The judgment 
is not satisfied nor the lien removed until 
the taxes are paid or the property sold for 
I 
the payment thereof." (Emphasis ours) 
l When a County offers property for sale during 
ray, it would have to be similar to a sheriff 1s sale. 
lu there are no buyers at a sheriff's sale, the Court 
I 
r\ains the property until it finds a buyer and then 
!offers it at a new sale. Since the County's interest 
I 
~s bound by the limitations imposed by the Consti-
1 
~tion and statutes, its claims or lien on the proper-
1 
ity can never grow without some adverse act. 
I 
4 
Appellant cannot see how the holding of prop-
erty by the County can improve or ripen an imperfect 
1 
title or change a lien against the property to owner-
·ship of the whole property. Cooley's Const. Limita-
tions Vol. II p. 768 states: 
"Statutes making defective records evidence 
of valid conveyances are of a similar nature 
arrl these usually, perhaps always, have 
reference to records before made, and provide 
for making them competent evidence where 
before they were merely void. nit they divest 
no title, and are not even retrospective in 
character. They merely establish what the 
legislature regards as a reasonable and ju.st 
rule for the presentation by the parties of 
their rights before the courts in the future. 
nit there are fixed bounds to the power 
of the legislature over this subject which 
cannot be exceeded. As to what shall be 
evidence, and 'vhich party shall assume the 
burden of proof in civil cases, its authority 
is practically unrestricted, so long as its 
regulations are impartial and uniform; bit 
it has no power to establish rules which, 
under pretense of regulating the presentation 
of evidence, go so far as altogether to Ereclude 
a party from emibiting his rights. 11 
(emphasis ours) 
5 
2. Concerning the word possession: Constructive 
~ssession is not synonomous with adverse possession. 
78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, and 78-12-7 .1 use the word 
, ~ssession. It can have no greater meaning in its 
use therewith than it had when it referred to the 
i possession of the owner before this section was 
i 
i passed. This was constructive possession and it 
I • I only requires that a proper deed carrying the rig..1.t 
I 
I to the ownership of the property be properly recorded 
' 
in the County where the land is situated. It there-
fore follows, that for this Court to read a greater 
~requirement pertaining to the word possession to be 
proven by appellants after the passage of this section 
than it had before was error. All these sections 
I , 
altered was, who had the presumption of constructive 
possession. It, in effect, was to make an equal 
I situation between pa;ties claiming the same piece 
I I of ground, and not to give one party an advantage 
i over the other. Such as would be the case concern-




I their possession within the meaning of the prior 
i 
' 
law or a different meaning than the one respondents 
claim under would revert to the injustice the legis-
1 lature lvas trying to correct. How could,, under the 
I equal protection clause, (U .s. Cons_ti tut ion 14th 
I Amendment) any other interrpretation be justified? . 
3. The Court erred in quieting title in res-
pondents for the reason that at the commencement of 
this action, respondents and their predecessors had 
paid ~ taxes on the subject property, were not,, and 
I had never been in possession or occupation thereof. 
Non payment is not congruous with payment. Cooley's 
Const. Limit. Vol. II p. 769 states: 
•••• it would not, we apprehend, be in the 
pmier of the legislature to declare that a 
particular item of evidence should preclude 
a party fro:n establishing his rights in oppo-
si tion to it. In judicial investigations the 
law of the land requires an opportunity for a 
trial; and there can be no trial if only one 
party is suffered to produce his proofs. 
The most formal conveyance may be a fraud or 
a forgery; public officers may connive with 
rogues to rob the citizen of his property; 
! 7 
l 
witnesses may testify or officers certify 
falsely, and records may be collusively 
manufactured for dishonest pirposes; and 
that legislation which would preclude the 
fraud or wrong being shown, and deprive the 
party wronged of all remedy, has no justifi-
cation in the principles of natural justice 
or of constitutional law. A statute, therefore, 
which should make a tax-deed conclusive evi-
dence of a complete title, and preclude the 
a;.-ner of the original title from showing its 
invalidity, would be void, because being not 
a law regulating evidence, but an unconstitu-
tional confiscation of pro 
&11phasis ours) 
Section ?S-12-5.l and ?S-12-5.2 are arbitrary 
and unreasonable and contrary to U .s. Constitution 
Amendment 14 for they make a distinction when there 
I should not be one. 
I 
If these sections do not apply when land is 
occupied, then why should they apply 'When land is 
vacant. This disti.."'lction between tax debtors bears 
no reasonable relation to the reason for their 
1 
enactment, namely as a means of enforcing the 
collection of taxes. 
Ii. Toronto vs. Sheffield 118 U 460, 222 P2d 594 Pt. #3. 
s 
4. The Court erred in barring appellants under 
the short statute 78-12-5.2 for the reason that if 
I the tax title was initiated upon the Auditor's Tax 
I 
I Deed to the County, then this is in strict violation 
I of the Constitutional provision that property may 
I not be taken for a public purpose without just comp-
ensation •. 'Art. 1 Section 22 Utah Constitution. 
1. Section 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 is an attempt 
"· •• no bill shall be passed.containing 
more than one subject, which shall be 
clearly expressed ·in its title.n 
I submit that the title to the act of which 
sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 are a part is not 
. clear as required by the above constitutional 
i I provision. .This act was enacted in 18'72 and was 
I originally titled: 
I 
I "An Act Limiting the Time of Commencing 
Civil Actions." 
l, Hansen v. Morris 3 U2d 310, 283 P2d 884. Pt. #4 
I 9 .. 
and has been a'llended to the following: 
"An Act amending sections 104-2-5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943 as amended by Chapter 18, 
Laws of Utah 1943; 104-2-7 Utah Code Annotated 
1943 and 104-2-12, Utah Code .Annotated 1943, 
and repealing section 104-2-5.10, as amended 
by Cbapterl9, Laws of Utah 1943 as amended 
by Chapter 8 Laws of Utah 1947, and enacting 
new laws to be known as sections 104-2-5.10 
and 104-2-5.11 limiting the period within 
which actions may be canmenced for reco~ery 
of real property sold and conveyed to the 
, County under tax deed or for the possession 
:- thereof." 
I submit that this act now covers two or more 
separate subjects namely: 
1. Time for commencing actions. 
l 
2. The means to increase revenue for the 
v~ious Counties of the State and as a means to 
cttcumvent the constitutional provisions relating to: 
a. Taxation 
b. Assessment of property 
c. Taking of private property for public 
purpose without just compensation. 
·and is void and of no force and effect! 
:1. Carter v State Tax Commission 98 U. 96, 96 P2d 7Z7 
126 ALR 1402 
10 
Cooley's Const. Lim.it Vol. I·.p. 338 states: 
Neither will a court, as a general rule pass 
upon a constitutional question, and decide a 
statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon 
that very point becomes necessary to the 
determination of the cause. '"mlile courts 
cannot shun the discussion of constitutional 
questions when fairly presented, they will 
not go out of their way to find such topics. 
They will not seek to draw in such weighty 
matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. 
It is both more proper and more respectful 
to a co-ordinate department to discuss con-
stitutional questions only when that is the 
very lis' mota. Thus presented and determined, 
the qecision carries a weight with it to 
which no extra-judicial disquisition is entitled." 
•••• Page 340 ••• and it is only when some 
person attempts to resist its operation, and 
calls in the aid of the judicial p~Ner to 
pronounce it void, as to him, his property or 
his rights, that the objection of unconstitu-
ti'.::inali ty can be presented and sustained. 
Respect for the legislature, therefore, concurs 
with well-established principles of law in the 
conclusion that such an act is not void, but 
voidable only; and it follows, as a necessary 
legal inference from this position, that this 
ground of avoidance can be taken advantage of 
by those only who have a right to question the 
validity of the act, and not by strangers. 
To this extent only is it necessary to go, in 
order to secure and protect the rights of all 
persons against the unwarranted exercise of 
legislative power, and to this extent only, 
therefore, are courts of justice called on to 
interpose." 
11 
Therefore appellants contend that they are 
not barred from this action and respectfully request 
a rehearing upon the matter. 
Respectfully Sul:mitted, 
1 ~/) . 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of this 
petition postpaid to respondents attorney Mary 
Condas Lehmer at 4528 South 2070 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117 
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